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Abstract  Fishing skill is perceived to play a crucial role in catching fish. The
question arises for fishery managers as to whether or not there are observable
and measurable attributes of the skipper or vessel that can be monitored and
regulated to account for skipper skill and, hence, this source of fishing capacity.
Equating technical efficiency with skipper skill, this paper evaluates technical
efficiency and skipper skill in the Kedah, Malaysia, trawl fishery to address this
issue.
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Introduction
Two questions that persist in fisheries are the nature of fishing skill, or the skipper
effect, and the importance of skipper skill for policies intended to give sustainable
resource harvesting. Skipper skill, or vessel managerial ability, has most often been
defined as the ability to consistently catch the most fish given the vessel, crew, and
other inputs (Barth 1966; Palsson and Durenberger 1982; Thorlindsson 1988). This
definition is precisely that of technical efficiency in fisheries (Kirkley, Squires, and
Strand 1998; Squires and Kirkley 1999).
The ongoing and persistent debate about the nature of skipper skill, recently
summarized by Russell and Alexander (1998) and Squires and Kirkley (1999), at-
tests to the unsettled discussion and scope for further understanding within the lit-
erature about this topic. Thorlindsson (1988), in summarizing the anthropological
literature on skipper skill, observed that there are two notions of skipper effect.
First, numerous authors have argued that any skipper effect should be consistent,
giving a relatively stable comparative ranking of fishing success across time (Barth
1966; Palsson and Durenberger 1982). Captains performing well in one season
should perform well in the following season. Second, the skipper effect is based on
the performance of individual skippers. This notion does not require a stable hierar-
chy of fishing success, but rather only a few noteworthy skippers with the catch
more or less randomly distributed between the rest of the captains.
Several aspects of these two notions of skipper effect stand out in the literature.
Barth (1966) stressed that the decision on where to search for fish in the Norwegian
herring fishery is the first and most important decision affecting the size of the
catch. Acheson (1981) identified three components of skipper skill: (i) the ability to
accurately navigate to find the best grounds; (ii) good knowledge of the ocean, such
as its currents, depths, and types of bottom; and (iii) good knowledge of the species
of concern. Thorlindsson (1988) identified three additional components of fishing
skill: (i) the ability to “read the sea” and its ecological environment; (ii) the willing-
ness of the skipper to search independently and to take calculated risks, which is
probably a function of many factors; and (iii) the ability of a skipper to lead and
manage the crew. In short, good landings are often associated with the skipper’s at-
tributes, knowledge of the fishery resource and environment, and exploitative skills.
The economics, sociological, and anthropological literatures have, to a limited
degree, empirically examined these factors affecting skipper skill. They have con-
centrated on measurable and quantifiable attributes of the skipper — measures of
the skipper’s human capital — because of the difficulties in measuring and even de-
fining attributes of fishing skill itself. Data limitations have also played a role, since
detailed and consistent knowledge of skipper behavior on a fishing trip is difficult to
obtain. Palsson and Durrenberger (1982), in a qualitative analysis, did not find a re-
lationship between skipper experience and catch rates (as opposed to technical effi-
ciency). Acheson (1975), reporting the results from a regression analysis, indicated
that skipper age was not a good surrogate variable for fishing skill, and that educa-
tion was marginally statistically insignificant. Within the technical efficiency frame-
work, Squires et al. (1998) with a stochastic production frontier examined attributes
of the captain and vessel and their influence on the technical efficiency of artisanal
gill net fisheries of the east and west coasts of Peninsular Malaysia. They found that
skipper characteristics were generally insignificant variables in explaining technical
inefficiency in both fisheries. For the US Pacific Coast groundfish trawl fishery,
Squires and Kirkley (1999) with a panel data approach found, through a Hausman
test, that inter-vessel differences in catch rates, interpreted as technical efficiency in
a panel data framework, were not correlated with input usage, but were instead re-Fishing Skill in a Malaysian Trawl Fishery 295
lated to inter-vessel differences. They attributed this result to skipper skill related to
finding fish, dealing with unforeseen events, and handling environmental conditions
rather than managing the inputs.
The vast majority of the discussion about skipper effect or skipper skill has cen-
tered on North Atlantic fisheries. Far less attention has been given to skipper skill in
the fisheries of developing countries. Firth (1975) and Squires et al. (1998) examined
skipper skill in Malaysia, and Russell and Alexander (1998) examined skipper skill for
the Philippines. Russell and Alexander (1998, p. 146) observed that in contrast to the
fishing fleets of industrialized nations, advances in electronic fish finding gear, the large
and variable size of boats, and sophisticated navigational equipment have partly diluted
the comparative advantage of traditional fishing skills. They further observed that in
some fleets of developing countries, technological advances have not been sufficient
to dilute fishing skill independent of fishing technology variables.
The ongoing discussion about skipper skill and the lack of conclusive empirical
evidence on it, suggests the need to further examine the role and significance of
skippers in influencing fish landings, and thereby shed further light on the first of
the two persistent questions in fisheries. Hence, addressing this need forms the first
purpose of this paper. That is, this paper empirically evaluates the differences in
skipper skill, defined as technical efficiency, across different vessels in a developing
country fishery and statistically assesses whether any measurable socio-demo-
graphic attributes of the skipper or fishing master — measures of human capital —
contribute to differences in skill.
The second question concerning fishing skill addressed in this paper arises in
the following context. Fishing capacity will not be capped or reduced in a license
limitation program to the extent that the production capabilities are related to fishing
skill and not only to the directly observed and controllable inputs (Hilborn and
Ledbetter 1979). Skipper managerial abilities are not directly observable and are be-
yond the control of fishery regulators. This fishery management problem arises in
two ways with fishing skill, but is related to the idea of “latent capacity.” First, the
most capable skippers tend to remain in a fishery, where they can earn intra-mar-
ginal rents. When the resource stock and rents begin to rebound under effective fish-
eries regulation, the most capable skippers can expand their catches faster than other
skippers through expansions in input usage. Second, the lower the technical effi-
ciency and skipper skill of a vessel remaining in the fishery, the greater the potential
to expand catch through learning-by-doing or by transfer of licenses to skippers with
greater technical efficiency.
The question thus arises for fishery regulators as to the degree that a skipper’s
skill, measured as technical efficiency, accounts for maximum potential and actual
catches. The more that skipper skill accounts for catch, as opposed to measurable in-
puts, such as the capital stock and fishing time, the more difficult the problem for a
license limitation program to control the capital stock and its utilization and thereby
attempt to cap fishing capacity.1 An ancillary question is whether or not there are
observable and measurable attributes of human or physical capital — the skipper or
vessel — that fishery regulators can monitor and possibly regulate to control expan-
sions in fishing capacity from this source. Hence, the second and final purpose of
this paper is to assess the relative importance of skipper skill in the fishing process
as it relates to limiting fishing capacity.
We address these two questions concerning skipper skill through a case study of
1 Fishing capacity can be defined as the maximum potential output (Kirkley and Squires 1999). In gen-
eral, there is only a nonlinear relationship between the capital stock and catch unless there is only a
single capital stock, all variable inputs are in fixed proportions to the single capital stock, there are con-
stant returns to scale, and the resource stock is constant (Kirkley and Squires 1999).Viswanathan, Omar, Jeon, Kirkley, Squires, and Susilowati 296
the Kedah, Malaysia, trawl fishery. We evaluate skipper skill, defined as technical
efficiency, through estimation of a stochastic production frontier along with a tech-
nical inefficiency function, the latter which is a function of socio-demographic at-
tributes of the fishing master. The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section gives a background of the fishery. The following section specifies the
empirical model, followed by discussion of the empirical results and their relation to
the fishing skill literature. Skipper skill and license limitation are discussed next,
and the last section provides concluding remarks.
The Kedah Trawl Fishery2
The fisheries of Peninsular Malaysia are highly diverse, comprising a multiplicity of
species and gear types. The important industrial gear types are trawl (pukat tunda)
and purse seine (pukat jerut) nets, where trawl gear harvest demersal (bottom-dwell-
ing) species and purse seines harvest pelagic (surface-dwelling) species. Demersal
fish account for about 30% of the total fish harvested in Peninsular Malaysia. The
west coast fishing grounds are generally muddy and shallow, which facilitates drag-
ging a trawl net on or near the ocean bottom. Trawlers and purse seiners together
contributed 81% of total fish landings and 77% of total wholesale value in Peninsu-
lar Malaysia in 1996. Trawlers catch fish indiscriminately, with a highly variable
species composition, of which about one-third may be “trash” fish.3 Overfishing in
inshore areas of the west coast has led to an increasing composition of “trash” fish
in total landings, reducing marketable output over time.
The 1981 Fisheries Licensing Policy aims to protect artisanal fisheries and con-
trol fishing capacity through the area licensing program.4 This regulation prohibits
trawling within the five-mile limit and allocates fishing grounds by zones and types
of gear; that is, by traditional versus commercial fishing gear and by vessel size.
The zonal licensing scheme attempts to fairly allocate fishing grounds and resources
between the highly efficient trawlers and purse seiners versus the less efficient tradi-
tional gear types. This scheme is also expected to reduce competition and conflict
between the operators of the commercial and artisanal groups, especially over the
highly valuable prawn resource, found in abundance in coastal waters.
Although the regulations have been imposed to manage fisheries, in practice
noncompliance and incidence of encroachment by the large-scale vessels and even for-
eign operators into the prohibited fishing areas is common (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998;
Susilowati 1998). The outcome of noncompliance with the zonal regulation is overfish-
ing and conflicts over the resource bases. Noncompliance with the zoning regulation
2 This section draws from Ishak (1994); Ishak, et al. (1991); Jahara (1988); Kuperan (1992); Majid
(1985); Ooi (1990); Susilowati (1998); Teo (1998); Vincent, Rozali, and Jahara (1997); and Abu Talib
and Alias (1997).
3 Trash fish include an assortment of juveniles of commercial and non-commercial species that are un-
suitable for human consumption. Due to their small size, trash fish are processed into fishmeal and sold
as animal feed or turned into fertilizer. Trash fish can also include species that are unwanted, such as
finfish caught while harvesting prawns. These trash fish jointly harvested with prawns are often dis-
carded at sea.
4 Malaysian fisheries are divided into four zones (Abdullah and Kuperan 1997). Zone A, which covers
all areas within 5 miles from the shoreline, is reserved for traditional fishing gear owners or operated by
traditional fishers. Zone B, which covers waters beyond 5 miles to 12 miles from the shoreline, is re-
served for vessels with either trawl or purse seine gear weighing less than 40 gross registered tons
(GRT). Zone C, which covers waters beyond 12 miles to 30 miles from the shoreline, is reserved for
trawlers and purse seiners weighing less than 40 GRT owned and operated by Malaysian fishers. Zone
D, which covers waters beyond 30 miles, is reserved for fishing vessels weighing greater than 70 GRT,
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poses a serious problem and undermines the effectiveness of fisheries management.
Fishing and fish availability are seasonal. Primary oceanic and secondary bio-
logical production do not demonstrate strong seasonal fluctuations in the tropics
(Pauly and Navaluna 1983). However, the adverse weather of the monsoon season
makes the fishing operation more difficult. Heavy rains, rough seas, and strong
winds make transit to and from fishing grounds more difficult and complicate de-
ploying and retrieving nets. The monsoon season can also alter the distribution and
availability of nutrients and fish.
The trawl fishery of concern in this study covers the fishing locality of Kuala
Kedah in the state of Kedah on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Table 1 and
portions of table 4 report summary statistics of this fishery from a 1995 representa-
tive sample capturing about 25% of the vessels (the data sampling process is dis-
cussed below). Vessels average 33 gross registered tons (GRT), with a substantial
range, from 5 to 65 (table 1). Horsepower averages 276, also with a substantial
range, from 50 to 400 (table 1). The number of men per boat averages just slightly
fewer than 4, with a range from 2 to 8 (table 1). The larger vessels are fully capable
of fishing in the farthest reaches of the Malaysian Extended Economic Zone, whereas
the smaller vessels are confined to innermost waters. All vessels harvest throughout
the year and throughout all seasons. Most vessels are home ported in Kuala Kedah,
and the rest are scattered among Tangkang Yard, Komplek’s LKIM (Lembaga
Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia), Kampung Masjid Lama, and Kuala Sala (table 4).
Skippers are generally highly experienced, with a mean of 24-years of fishing
experience and a mean age of almost 46 years (table 1). About 50% of the skippers
are Malay, and about 50% are Chinese or other (table 4). About 50% of the skippers
are owner operators (table 4). Their education is generally at the primary level.
Trip characteristics vary by season (table 1). In the peak season, vessels average
a catch of about 1,587 kg from a trip of almost 18 hours. In the off-season, average
catch declines to about 609 kg per trip of almost 21 hours. In the normal season,
vessels average a catch per trip of 908 kg from a trip of almost 22 hours. In sum, the
productivity or catch per unit effort increases from the normal to peak season, but
declines from the normal to the off-season.
Empirical Model
A fishing vessel’s technical efficiency is a measure of its ability to produce relative
to the fleet’s best-practice frontier, the maximum output possible from a given set of
inputs and production technology (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977; Meeusen and
van den Broeck 1977). Technical inefficiency is the deviation of an individual
vessel’s production from this best-practice frontier. The estimated frontier is speci-
fied stochastic, because fishing is sensitive to random factors such as weather, re-
source availability, and environmental influences (Kirkley, Squires, and Strand
1995). The estimation takes the current state of technology, resource abundance and
availability, regulatory structure, and open-access property rights regime as given.
The stochastic frontier and technical efficiency results could alter under a different
set of conditions. Hannesson (1983) estimated the first production frontier in fisher-
ies, albeit a deterministic frontier.
The translog stochastic production frontier for firm or vessel i in time or season
t, where symmetry conditions have been imposed, is specified by:
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Yit denotes total output (catch) in kilograms measured as the geometric mean of all
species landed, where revenue shares serve as weights. The vessel capital stock (Kit)
is a volumetric measure given by vessel GRT; labor (Lit) is the number of crew em-
ployed per vessel for a fishing trip, including the captain. The hours per trip (Tit) repre-
sents variable input usage (e.g., diesel and/or gasoline, lubricant and/or oil, ice, and mis-
cellaneous variable inputs), and can be viewed as an indicator of effort. In addition,
to provide service flows of capital and labor, Kit and Lit are multiplied by trip time
Tit. Thus, Tit enters the stochastic frontier in two different ways, both as a variable
input or fishing effort and to convert stocks of capital and labor to service flows.5
Table 1
Summary Statistics of the Data
Standard
Vessel and Fishing Characteristic Mean Median Maximum Minimum Deviation
Location 1.52 1 5 1
Years experience as fisher 24.22 25 50 8 8.05
Age (years) 45.73 45 76 19 8.17
Ethnic group 1.59 2 4 1
Boat ownership 1.56 2 2 1 0.50
Vessel tonnage (GRT) 33.47 33 65 5 12.62
Horsepower 276.15 250 400 50 82.15
Schooling experience 1.06 1 2 1
Household size (persons) 5.99 6 18 0 2.25
No. of family members working 2.25 2 14 0 2.26
No. of children schooling 1.91 2 6 0 1.50
Peak season
No. of hours/trip 17.65 12.5 72 2 13.30
Average kg catch/trip 1,586.82 1,300 20,000 100 2,007.56
No. of men in boat/trip 3.94 4 6 2 0.88
Off season
No. of hours/trip 20.59 14.5 70 6 15.02
Average kg catch/trip 608.53 325 3500 10 634.02
No. of men in boat/trip 3.98 4 8 2 0.96
Normal season
No. of hours/trip 21.75 14 72 6.4 15.58
Average kg catch/trip 907.54 675 10,000 10 1,134.59
No. of men in boat/trip 3.94 4 6 2 0.88
Notes:  Location = 1 if home port is Kuala Kedah and 2 if elsewhere in Kedah.
Ethnic group = 1 if vessel is skippered by Malay, 2 if by Chinese, 3 if by Indian, and 4 if by other.
Boat ownership = 1 if vessel is owner-operated and 2 otherwise.
Schooling experience = 1 if formal education and 2 if no formal education.
Household size, family members working, and children schooling pertain to the captain.
5 Campbell and Hand (1998) and Kirkley and Squires (1999) provide extensive discussions of the use of
stocks and flows in specifications of inputs in fishery production functions. The use of flow variables
has the potential to introduce multicollinearity into the regression results. When data on capital value
are available, a preferred approach is to calculate the user cost of capital and then transform this into a
flow variable by dividing the total capital value by the capital services price/user cost of capital.Fishing Skill in a Malaysian Trawl Fishery 299
The error term ε it for vessel i in time t in equation (1) is defined as ε it = Vit – Uit.
The two-sided error term, Vit, captures exogenous stochastic shocks and is assumed
to be symmetrical and independently and identically distributed as N(0,  σ V
2 ).. The
non-negative error term, Uit, captures differences in technical inefficiency and is as-
sumed to be an independently distributed non-negative random variable, such that
Uit is the truncation of a normal distribution at zero, with mean µ it = Zδ  and variance
σ U
2 , N(Z  δσ , U
2 ).6 The one-sided, non-negative random variable, Uit, representing
technical inefficiency, must be non-negative so that no firm can perform better than
the best-practice frontier. The independent distribution of Vit and Uit allows the sepa-
ration of noise and technical inefficiency. Z defines a (1xM) vector of explanatory
variables associated with the technical inefficiency function, and δ  is an (Mx1) vec-
tor of unknown parameters to be estimated (Battese and Coelli 1995).7
The technical inefficiency function, comprised of the vector of variables Z, is
specified as a function of measurable socio-demographic attributes of the skippers—
proxy variables for the skippers’ human capital—along with measurable attributes of
the crew, vessel, and indicators of seasons. The technical inefficiency function is
specified as:
U EXP HOUSEHOLD CREW D D it it it it OWN EDU =+ + + + + δδ δ δ δ δ 01 2 3 4 5 (2)
++ +++ + + δδ δ δδ δ 6 7 8 9 10 11 DD D D D D W AREA ETHNIC OFF PEAK SMALL LARGE
where EXPit denotes the captain’s years of fishing experience; HOUSEHOLDit de-
notes total household size (in persons, including the captain); and CREWit denotes
number of persons per vessel (including captain).8,9 The eight D terms are dummy
variables equal to one when: (1) the operator does not own the vessel (OWN); (2)
the captain has not received formal education (EDU); (3) the vessel is home-ported
in Komplek’s LKIM, Kampung Masjid Lama, Kuala Sala, or Tangkang Yard
(AREA); (4) the captain is Chinese, Indian, or an ethnic group other than Malay
(ETHNIC); (5) the vessel fishes in the off-monsoon season (OFF); (6) the vessel
fishes in the peak season (PEAK); (7) the vessel is less than or equal to 15 GRT
(SMALL); and (8) the vessel is greater than 50 GRT (LARGE). These eight dummy
variables are defined for vessel i and do not vary over a year; i.e., the assignment is
6 The truncated normal distribution was originally proposed by Stevenson (1980).
7 Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) first noted the in-
consistency between inefficiency effects if, in the first stage, the error is independently and identically
distributed and the predicted inefficiency effects in the second stage are specified as a function of a
number of firm-specific factors (which implies that they are not identically distributed unless all the co-
efficients of the factors are simultaneously equal to zero). The two-stage procedure is unlikely to pro-
vide estimates which are as efficient as those that are obtained from the one-step estimation procedure
(Coelli 1996).
8 Household size is included as a proxy variable to capture sociological impacts from family size.
Household size, for example, may provide a motivating factor that influences trip length, catch size and
composition, choice and numbers of crewmembers (some of whom may be included to fulfill familial
obligations), and the like. Household size is expected to be directly related to technical inefficiency.
9 Inclusion of crew size creates a stochastic production frontier that is non-neutral along the lines of
Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Broca (1997), except that there are no interactions between the
inputs of equation (1) and the vector Z of equation (2). The technical inefficiency effects, defined by
equation (2), imply that shifts in the frontier for different firms depend, in part, on the levels of the input
crew. In addition, we include crew (labor) as a continuous variable, exclude fishing time, and include
large vessel size as dummy variables rather than with the same specifications as in equation (1), in order
to reduce multicollinearity. In the stochastic frontier, equation (1), labor is specified as a service flow,
since catch rates depend on the flow over time. However, in the technical inefficiency function, equation
(2), we specify labor as a stock, since we are interested in the relationship between technical ineffi-
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constant. The seasonal dummy variables allow for seasonal variations in weather,
ocean conditions, and resource availability. The intercept δ 0 captures the case of a
trawl vessel: greater than 15 GRT but less than or equal to 50 GRT which is home-
ported in Kuala Kedah; owned and operated by a Malay captain with formal educa-
tion; and which fishes in the normal season. A random error term, Wit,was added to
equation (2) for estimation.10
Technical inefficiency for each firm i in season t is defined as the ratio of actual
output to the potential frontier output. Uit is not directly observable, but Jondrow et
al. (1982) found its expected value of Uit conditional on the value of ε it = Vit – Uit,
i.e., E(Uit|ε it). Technical efficiency for each firm is defined as TEit = exp(–Uit) =
exp(–Zitδ  – Wit), where exp is the exponential operator (Battese and Coelli 1988).
The range of technical efficiency for firm or vessel i in season t (TEit) is 0 ≤  TEit ≤  1,
where TEit = 1 represents the achievement of maximum output (adjusted for random
fluctuations) for the given inputs, or 100% efficiency.
The elasticity of mean production with respect to the kth input variable, denoted
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and φ  and Φ  represent the density and distribution functions of the standard normal
random variable, respectively.
The elasticity of the mean output with respect to the kth input in equation (3) has
two components (Battese and Broca 1997). The first component, α k + 2α kkXkit + Σ j≠ k
Xjit, is the traditional production elasticity of output with respect to the kth input, and
is referred to as the elasticity of frontier output. The second component, – Cit [∂µ it/
∂ Xk], is non-zero in the non-neutral inefficiency model and zero for the neutral sto-
chastic frontier model. This component is called the elasticity of technical efficiency
with respect to the kth input.
The stochastic frontier, equation (1), and the technical inefficiency function,
equation (2), were jointly estimated by maximum likelihood using Frontier 4.1
(Coelli 1996), under the behavioral hypothesis that fishers maximize expected prof-
10 In addition, there may be correlations between the explanatory variables of the frontier and the ineffi-
ciency effects, especially the continuous variables that appear in both equations. In this case, the maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) estimators of the parameters would not be consistent. However, the asymptotic
properties of the ML estimators for this type of model are currently under investigation (Battese and
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its (Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 1966).11 Campbell (1991) makes this case for fisher-
ies due to the stochastic nature of output and acts of nature. The frontier and ineffi-
ciency functions are estimated as panel data by the approach of Battesse and Coelli
(1995), thereby allowing for firm-specific fixed effects between vessels.
Several hypotheses about the model can be tested using generalized likelihood
ratio tests. The first null hypothesis is whether or not technical inefficiency effects
are absent; i.e., H0:  σ U
2  = 0. This null hypothesis is specified as: γ = 0, where γ =
σσ σ UV U
22 2 () +  and lies between 0 and 1. Non-rejection of the null hypothesis, H0: γ
= 0, indicates that the U term should be removed from the model. This result further
indicates that the stochastic production frontier is rejected in favor of ordinary least
squares estimation of the average production function in which the explanatory vari-
ables in the technical inefficiency function are included in the production function.12
The second hypothesis is whether or not the functional form of the stochastic pro-
duction frontier, equation (1), is Cobb Douglas. The null hypothesis is α 4 = α 5 = …
= α 9 = 0 in equation (1). The third hypothesis is whether or not the technical ineffi-
ciency function, equation (2), is influenced by the level of explanatory variables.
Under the assumption that the inefficiency effects are distributed as a truncated nor-
mal, the null hypothesis is that the matrix of parameters, excluding the intercept
term α 0, is null such that α 1 = α 2 = … = δ 11 = 0.13
As discussed above, one of the two important features of the notion of skipper
skill stressed in the literature is the consistent performance of an individual skipper
over time. To test whether the individual skipper effect or skill, interpreted as com-
parative ranking of technical efficiency, is consistent over time, we use the Wilcox
matched-pairs signed ranks test to test the null hypothesis that the distributions of
technical efficiency are the same for all three seasons. We also use the Mann-
Whitney test for testing the null hypothesis that the two independent samples of
technical efficiency scores pertaining to two different seasons are from populations
with the same distribution.
11 The specification of technical inefficiency as unexpected and unknown, or as expected and foreseen,
when the firm chooses its inputs affects the specification and estimation of the production function
(Kumbhakar 1987). Given the overwhelming importance of “captain’s skill” in locating and catching
fish and the inherent stochastic effects from weather, temperature, and biological variations in fishing, it
is likely that technical inefficiency that is unforeseen is more important than the foreseen. The point is
that technical inefficiency is likely to never be entirely foreseen or unforeseen, but in fishing, technical
inefficiency is more likely to be unexpected and unknown. Thus, we specify the technical inefficiency as
unexpected or unforeseen. Given unknown and unexpected technical inefficiency, the argument of ex-
pected profit maximization (Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 1966) can be used to treat inputs as exogenous
(Kumbhakar 1987, p. 336). If technical inefficiency is known to the firm, estimates of the production
function parameters obtained directly from the profit function will be inconsistent.
12 Any generalized likelihood ratio statistic associated with a null hypothesis involving the γ parameter
has a mixed chi-square distribution because the restriction defines a point on the boundary of the param-
eter space (Coelli 1996). The critical values are given in table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). The number
of restrictions, and hence the degrees of freedom for the null hypothesis = 0, is the difference in the
number of parameters in the test of the OLS model versus the stochastic production frontier, equal to
one for one for µ  with the truncated normal (associated with δ 0, the intercept of the technical ineffi-
ciency function) plus the number of terms in the technical inefficiency function, excepting δ 0, which
would not enter the traditional mean response function (Battese and Coelli 1995, footnote 6). In this
case, all variables in Z, except δ 0, would enter the translog production function as log-linear control
variables, so that the degrees of freedom for H0: γ = 0 is two.
13 Not including an intercept parameter (δ 0) in the mean (Zi δ ) may result in the estimators of the δ -pa-
rameters, associated with the Z-variables, being biased and the shape of the distributions of the ineffi-
ciency effects, Ui, being unnecessarily restricted (Battese and Coelli 1995). Battese and Coelli (1995)
note that when the Z vector has the value 1 and the coefficients of all other elements of Z are 0,
Stevenson’s (1980) model is represented. The intercept δ 0 in the technical inefficiency function will
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Data
Multistage sampling was applied to obtain the 126 respondents. Fishers were strati-
fied based on gear type, and the list of fishing vessels in the area was collected from
the fisher cooperative unit office for 1994, the period of the study. The 126 trawl
vessels in the sample were selected randomly from a population of 488 trawl vessels
in Kedah. The sampling unit was the fisher with a decision-making role while at sea.
In other words, he was the fishing master who decided whether or not to fish. Data
were obtained for each vessel for the normal, off (monsoon), and peak seasons, giv-
ing a total of 378 observations and a balanced panel data set. Respondents were que-
ried about a “typical” (i.e., mean) fishing trip in the different fishing seasons in the
preceding year.14 The data were verified with a selected number of fishers by asking
them if the figures provided are along the lines of values they consider appropriate.
Peak season refers to the season when catches are usually high (above one standard
deviation from the mean catch). Off-season refers to the months when catches are
low (one standard deviation below the mean) due to monsoons. Normal season re-
fers to the months when catches are around the mean catch for the year. Each ethnic
group had the same understanding of season.
Undergraduate students in the Faculty of Economics and Management,
Universiti Putra Malaysia conducted the in-person interviews. The interviewers
were selected based on their working experience as an enumerator, subjects or
courses taken in their undergraduate programs, and proficiency in the use of local
dialect/language. Training was given to all enumerators before they undertook the
survey. Susilowati (1998) provides additional discussion of the data collection pro-
cess.
Empirical Results
The generalized likelihood ratio tests of the three null hypotheses, summarized in
table 2, indicate that at the 1% level of significance: (1) the stochastic production
frontier is appropriate for the sample of data (H0: γ = 0 is rejected); (2) the translog
functional form rather than the Cobb Douglas is selected for the stochastic produc-
tion frontier (H0: α 4 = α 5 = … = α 9 = 0 is rejected); and (3) the technical ineffi-
ciency function is comprised of the vector of explanatory variables (H0: δ 1 = δ 2 = …
= δ 11 = 0 is rejected).
Parameter estimates of the final form of the stochastic production frontier, equa-
tion (1), are reported in table 3. The distribution of technical efficiency scores, rela-
tive to the best practice frontier scores, is reported in table 4 and figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 illustrates the technical efficiency scores for all vessels over all three sea-
sons. Season and vessel or data management unit (DMU) is presented in figure 2.
The top panel gives technical efficiency scores for the peak season, the middle panel
gives scores for the off-season, and the bottom panel gives scores for the normal
season. The scores for each vessel are vertically aligned in figure 2. Hence, the
score for a vessel in the peak season lies directly above the score for a vessel in the
off-season, and a vessel’s scores for the peak and off-seasons are directly above that
vessel’s score for the normal season.
14 The use of recall data from a “typical” trip introduces both measurement error and heteroskedasticity
to the extent that a “typical” trip represents a mean performance (which gives grouped data and hence
heteroskedasticity). There is no obvious correction for any measurement error and likely
heteroskedasticity given the current state of development of the stochastic production frontier.Fishing Skill in a Malaysian Trawl Fishery 303
Perhaps the most salient feature throughout the year is the wide range of techni-
cal efficiency, ranging from 0.01 to 0.95 (table 4, figure 1). The efficiency scores
are distributed around the mean of 0.49, with, given the sample size of 378 observa-
tions, remarkably few vessels in the low and high score tails (figure 1). The mean of
0.49 across all three seasons is lower than that generally found from stochastic fron-
tiers for developing country agriculture (Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro 1993, table 1)
and the comparatively high value found by Squires et al. for the Peninsular Malay-
sian gill net fleet of artisanal fishers. The comparatively low mean level of technical
efficiency found in this study contrasts with Schultz’s (1964) thesis of “poor and ef-
ficient” smallholders and peasants in developing country agriculture.
Table 2
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests of Hypotheses for Parameters of the
Stochastic Frontier Production Function and Technical Inefficiency Function
Critical Critical
Null Hypothesis Likelihood Ratio df Value (5%) Value (1%)
1. γ = 0 193.504 2 5.138 8.273
(No stochastic frontier)
2. α  = α 5 = … = α 9 = 0 32.599 6 12.592 16.812
(Cobb-Douglas frontier)
3. δ 1 = δ 2 = … = δ 11 = 0 157.110 11 19.675 24.725
(No technical inefficiency fn.)
Notes: 1. Test for γ = 0 follows mixed chi-square distribution with critical values found in table 1 of
Kodde and Palm (1986).
2. df = degrees of freedom.
3. A truncated-normal distribution is specified for the technical inefficiency error term.
Table 3
Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Production Frontier
Variables Parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Ratio
Intercept α 0 –0.81 0.32 –0.25
ln K α 1 1.75 1.30 1.35
ln L α 2 6.50 2.49 2.61
ln T α 3 –0.79 0.73 –1.08
ln K2 α 4 –0.42 0.20 –2.13
ln L2 α 5 –2.29 0.97 –2.37
ln T2 α 6 0.31 0.09 3.55
ln K* ln L α 7 0.92 0.82 1.12
ln K*ln T α 8 0.28 0.23 1.25
ln L*ln T α 9 –1.26 0.34 –3.71
σ 2 0.94 0.18 5.22
γ 0.71 0.07 10.03
Log-likelihood –0.428
No. of observations 378
Notes: 1. K = GRT (vessel tonnage); L = no. of men in boat/trip; T = no. of hours/trip.
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The frequency distribution over all seasons also differs from that typically
found in less developed country agriculture, where the agricultural distribution is
typically skewed toward higher efficiency levels (figure 1). At first blush in this
fishery, in contrast, the distribution tends towards the normal (wider intervals would
push the distribution towards the normal). The distribution, however, settles down as
a hybrid between a normal and a skewing toward the high end due to a peak fre-
Table 4
Frequency Distribution of Technical Efficiency Scores
Range (0,0.2) (0.2,0.4) (0.4,0.6) (0.6,0.8) (0.8,1.0)
Total count 56 91 88 94 49
Location (count)
(1) Kuala Kedah 46 75 73 82 42
(2) Kompleks 31200
(3) Kampung Masjid Lama 34020
(4) Kuala Sala 43110
(5) Tangkong Yard 0 8 12 9 7
Years experience as fisher (mean) 25.53 24.42 23.27 24.73 23.06
Age  (mean) 47.11 45.21 44.88 46.68 44.84
Ethnic group (count)
(1) Malay 51 52 34 32 5
(2) Chinese 5 39 52 57 42
(4) Others 00252
Boat ownership (count)
(1) Boat owner 35 48 38 34 13
(2) Others 21 43 50 60 36
Vessel tonnage (mean GRT) 27.28 31.43 35.67 35.26 36.96
Horsepower (mean) 227.29 263.24 287.61 290.27 307.96
Schooling experience (mean) 1.05 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.04
Household size (mean) 6.21 6.35 5.93 5.82 5.49
No. of family members working 2.16 2.27 2.26 2.33 2.10
No. of children schooling 2.16 2.05 2.02 1.64 1.69
Peak season (mean)
Count 1 7 16 55 47
No. of hours/trip 24.00 24.00 16.53 15.31 19.68
Average kg catch/trip 200.00 264.00 316.88 1,229.44 2,663.83
No. of men in boat/trip 3.00 3.57 3.38 3.98 4.15
Off season (mean)
Count 36 51 27 12 na
No. of hours/trip 16.99 19.13 25.59 26.33
Average kg catch/trip 89.86 435.88 1,118.89 1,750.00
No. of men in boat/trip 3.53 4.06 4.19 4.58
Normal season (mean)
Count 19 33 45 27 2
No. of hours/trip 17.68 15.24 22.20 32.81 8.00
Average kg catch/trip 125.79 366.37 930.44 1,592.59 7,500.00
No. of men in boat/trip 3.37 3.64 4.16 4.29 4.50
Mean: 0.49; minimum: 0.01; maximum: 0.95; std. dev.: 0.24.
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quency at a comparatively high level of efficiency. In sum, the vast majority of the
Kedah trawlers have comparatively low levels of technical efficiency over all sea-
sons and face substantial scope for technical efficiency gains, given the state of their
technology.
The magnitude, algebraic sign, and significance of the estimated coefficients in
equation (2), the technical inefficiency function, can analyze the factors affecting
technical inefficiency in the model, given the sample data. Table 5 provides the esti-
mated technical inefficiency function, where the dependent variable is technical ineffi-
ciency as opposed to technical efficiency. Thus, a negative sign indicates a decrease
in technical inefficiency or an increase in technical efficiency. The statistically sig-
nificant variables in the technical inefficiency function are the intercept, ethnicity of
the captain, fishing in the off and peak seasons, and a large (> 50 GRT) vessel.
Efficiency and Season
Season is one of the most important of these statistically significant variables affect-
ing efficiency. The most striking result is the variation of technical efficiency by
season (table 4, figure 2). Most vessels are technically efficient (around 0.8) during
the peak season, so that there is only one regime of efficiency in the peak season.
Compared to the normal and off seasons, the largest mean catch per trip and the
lowest mean number of hours per trip are found in the peak season (table 1). The
vessels that are strongly inefficient in the normal season are also very inefficient in
the other two seasons (figure 2). In the normal season, there are two efficiency re-
gimes, moderate efficiency (around 0.6) or very low efficiency, with overall effi-
Figure 1. Frequency of Technical EfficienciesViswanathan, Omar, Jeon, Kirkley, Squires, and Susilowati 306
Figure 2. Technical Efficiency over Season by DMUFishing Skill in a Malaysian Trawl Fishery 307
ciency much lower than found during the peak season. Moreover, the lower effi-
ciency regime dominates the higher efficiency regime during the normal season. The
normal season efficiency level lies between the levels of the peak (highest) and off
(lowest) seasons. The normal season means (catch and hours per trip) lie intermedi-
ate between the peak and off-seasons, although the highest number of hours per trip
is found for the normal season (table 1).
During the off-season, there are also two efficiency regimes, but the lower-level
regime dominates the higher-level regime, giving a very low overall level of effi-
ciency (table 4, figure 2). Resource abundance, and especially availability, decline
during the off-season. The number of hours per trip and mean catch per trip decline
compared to the peak and normal seasons, while the number of men in the boat
rises. Hence, the immediate source of efficiency decline in the monsoon season is
clear: a smaller volume of fish is caught by a slightly higher number of persons in
the boat. These immediate factors, in turn, are the consequence of reduced resource
availability and less favorable operating conditions. Campbell and Hand (1998)
similarly found that season had an important effect on technical efficiency in the
Solomon Islands pole-and-line fishery.
Efficiency and Vessel Size
Technical efficiency rises slightly with vessel size (table 4). The lowest-efficiency
vessels average 27 GRT, and GRT increases with vessel tonnage to an average of al-
most 37 for the most efficient vessels. The dummy variable for the largest vessel
size class (> 50 GRT) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that vessels
of this size class decrease technical inefficiency (table 5). Similarly, technical effi-
ciency rises with engine horsepower, from a mean of 227 for the least efficient ves-
sels to a mean of 308 for the most efficient vessels (table 4). Along similar lines,
crew size increases with technical efficiency for all three seasons (table 4), although
Table 5
Estimated Technical Inefficiency Function
Variable Coefficient St. Error t-Ratio
Intercept 1.97 0.93 2.12
Years experience as fisher 0.02 0.01 1.64
Household size of fishing master (persons) –0.06 0.04 –1.37
No. of men in boat/trip –0.14 0.20 –0.71
Dummy variables for:
Boat ownership –0.35 0.20 –1.72
Formal education of fishing master 0.08 0.41 0.20
Area of home port 0.05 0.29 0.17
Ethnicity of captain –1.30 0.29 –4.55
Off season 0.72 0.20 3.58
Peak season –1.77 0.60 –2.95
Small vessel –0.34 0.37 –0.93
Large vessel 1.18 0.47 2.51
Notes: 1. Estimated coefficients from a truncated normal distribution for technical inefficiency, error term,
and translog stochastic production frontier.
2. Coefficients obtained from estimation of equation (2), where technical inefficiency is the dependent variable.
3. Small vessel: <15 GRT and large vessel >50 GRT.Viswanathan, Omar, Jeon, Kirkley, Squires, and Susilowati 308
this variable is statistically insignificant in the estimated technical inefficiency func-
tion (table 5).
Efficiency and Skipper Ethnicity
Technical efficiency varies by ethnicity of the skipper (tables 4, 5). The dummy
variable for Indian, Chinese, and other skippers is negative and statistically signifi-
cant in the technical inefficiency function (table 5). Similarly, the number of Malay
skippers declines with increases in efficiency, whereas the number of Chinese and
other ethnic group skippers rises with increases in efficiency (table 4). This result
contrasts with those of Squires et al. (1998) for the Peninsular Malaysian artisanal
gill net fishery, where ethnicity of the skipper did not affect technical efficiency.
Chinese skippers generally entered first into the trawl and purse seine fisheries, and
Malays were comparative latecomers. Mean years of fishing experience does not ap-
preciably differ by technical efficiency class or ethnic group (tables 4, 5). Nonethe-
less, the greater length of time for Malaysian Chinese as a group in this fishery may
have led to accumulated knowledge that has been passed down within this group and
has not been disseminated outside of it. Among Chinese skippers or fishers, there
may also be greater networking and sharing of information within the Chinese com-
munity as opposed to Malay fishers. Training among the Chinese community may
also take place earlier, and the Chinese were the first to acquire and use modern
equipment, such as echo sounders and fish detection devices. Chinese fishers also
have bigger boats and more sophisticated fishing equipment and are generally better
trained in their use than the Malay fishers. Malay fishers might also be more subject
to credit constraints. Squires et al. (1998) found that participation in a skipper train-
ing program did not affect technical efficiency of artisanal gill net fishers, but per-
haps in this offshore fishery such a program might find more room for success.
Efficiency and Owner-Operatorship
The absence of a statistically significant owner-operator effect on technical ineffi-
ciency provides an indication that, in this fishery, the asymmetric information prob-
lem between the owner (principal) and operator (agent) and the general “contrac-
tual” problems between principals and agents may not be noteworthy. The potential
moral hazard problem may not arise due to the share system or perhaps other fac-
tors, such as a strong personal relation to the owner or close observance by others.
Efficiency and Skipper Skill Literature
The null hypothesis that some skippers consistently demonstrated superior skipper
skill, as measured by comparatively higher technical efficiency scores across sea-
sons, was rejected by both the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and the
Mann-Whitney test (table 6). This absence of consistently superior technical effi-
ciency across time periods by some skippers differs from Squires and Kirkley
(1999), who found such skipper skill for the Pacific coast trawl fishery.
The Malaysian trawl result is inconsistent with Thorlindsson’s (1988) summary
of the two notions of the skipper effect, in that the skipper effect is inconsistent
across the three seasons. Perhaps over multiple years, a skipper’s technical effi-
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The limited number of statistically significant variables in the technical ineffi-
ciency function (intercept, ethnicity of the captain, fishing in the off and peak sea-
sons, and large vessel) suggests the difficulty in finding suitable socio-demographic
measures of skipper skill. The components of skipper skill identified by Barth
(1966), Acheson (1981), and Thorlindsson (1988) are all highly intangible and diffi-
cult to capture by readily observable proxy variables. The statistically significant in-
tercept may be capturing some of these intangibles. Education and experience, the
two most obvious measures of human capital, did not. Vessel size may indirectly
capture skill to the extent that there are disadvantages to vessel size, and the supe-
rior skipper gravitates to smaller vessels. In any case, the factors explaining skipper
skill are clearly a difficult problem to capture, and additional research in this area is
required.
The limited number of readily observable and measurable skipper characteris-
tics significantly affecting technical efficiency and skipper skill, combined with the
wide variation in technical efficiency, highlights how little is known about the
socio-demographic factors — measurable attributes of the skipper’s human capital
— that play a role in affecting relative catch rates. In contrast, in developing country
agriculture, certain observable farmer characteristics, such as education, experience,
and contacts with extension agents generally affect technical efficiency (Bravo-
Ureta and Pinheiro 1993). Knowledge of these socio-demographic factors in devel-
oping country agriculture facilitates policies that raise yields and incomes to be
more clearly and consistently formulated.
Production Elasticities
The production elasticities for the estimated model, estimated from equation (3) at
the mean of the data set for each season and comprised of the elasticity of frontier
output and the elasticity of technical efficiency, are inelastic for all three variables,
capital (K), labor (L), and effort (T) (table 7). The production elasticities vary only
slightly by season. The negative elasticity for labor, L, in all seasons suggests that
the mean vessel may be subject to input congestion in which the isoquant has a posi-
tive slope and in which it operates in Stage III of the production function.15 This re-
sult is consistent with the comparatively low level of technical efficiency found in
Table 6
Hypothesis Tests of Consistent Skipper Skill Across Seasons
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs
Signed Rank Mann-Whitney Test
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Significance Test Statistic Significance
Peak season = Off season 9.738 0.000 12.200 0.000
Peak season = Normal season 9.621 0.000 10.428 0.000
Normal season = Off season 8.065 0.000 –5.058 0.000
Note: Skipper skill equated to superior technical efficiency.
15 The negative sign for L could also reflect multicollinearity, even in the face of panel data and large
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this study. Vessels may be crewing their vessels too heavily for social reasons.
Alternatively, the smallest value for labor’s production elasticity occurs in the
peak season, when the value is almost zero and when the greatest need for labor oc-
curs. The results suggest that vessels operators may determine their crew size for the
peak season (when the largest catches occur), and due to rigidities in the labor mar-
ket, maintain a larger crew than otherwise required in the other seasons. Maintaining
a crew throughout the year to keep it intact and available in the peak demand peri-
ods is a common practice in, for example, the construction and building trades in-
dustries. This interpretation of input congestion would suggest that vessels either do
not strictly maximize profit, they impute a very low opportunity cost to labor, or
they incorrectly calculate their crew requirements during the peak season. Further
research is required in this area.
Returns to scale, calculated as the sum of the production elasticities, are 1.012
in the peak season, 0.907 in the off season, and 0.937 in the normal season. Hence,
returns to scale vary slightly by season, influenced by the elasticity of technical effi-
ciency and the strong seasonality in technical efficiency. Returns to scale in each
season are all decreasing (or very close to one), due to the input congestion for la-
bor. Reductions in crew sizes, thereby eliminating labor congestion, would help ves-
sels enjoy increasing returns to scale and some size economies.
Skipper Skill and License Limitation
License limitation programs, especially those limiting vessels by areas or zones,
form the cornerstone for the regulation and sustainable resource use of many fisher-
ies in the tropics (Abdullah and Kuperan 1997). Tropical ecosystems are character-
ized by highly diverse species and complex interactions among species within their
habitat. In many areas, there are also real or potential gear conflicts (especially be-
tween artisanal and commercial-industrial fisheries). For these reasons, area license
programs are likely to remain the linchpin to fisheries management in most of these
fisheries. Moreover, conventional management measures, such as catch quotas, have
generally proven ineffective in fisheries of these countries (FAO 1983).
Skipper skill, defined as the technical efficiency of a skipper, represents the
most difficult component of fishing capacity to monitor, measure, and account for in
license limitation programs and in regulation by total allowable catches (TACs). The
lower the level of technical efficiency, the greater the scope for expansion in maxi-
mum potential output for any given input bundle, state of technology, and environ-
mental and resource conditions.
In the Kedah trawl fishery, technical efficiency was comparatively low with a
wide range, indicating a broad range of skipper skill and substantial potential for in-
Table 7
Elasticities of Production
Input Peak Season Off Season Normal Season
Capital 0.866 0.919 0.925
Labor –0.099 –0.340 –0.363
Effort 0.245 0.328 0.375
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creasing production. Skipper characteristics, other than ethnicity, did not signifi-
cantly affect technical efficiency and skipper skill. Considerable scope for increased
catch exists during the off seasons for virtually all vessels and for many skippers,
even during the normal season. Hence, there is scope for increased capacity utiliza-
tion (defined as the ratio of observed to maximum potential catch) and consequent
pressures on resource stocks under license limitation.
Concluding Remarks
Fishing skill of captains in developing countries, interpreted as technical efficiency
of the skipper, has received little attention in the literature. This study sheds light on
this issue through a case study of the Kedah, Malaysia trawl fishery. The statistically
significant variables affecting skipper skill were season of the year, ethnicity of the
captain, and use of a large (> 50 GRT) vessel. The greatest scope for increasing skill
was during the off-season, when monsoon weather and resource conditions substan-
tially lower production. Ethnicity was the only socio-demographic variable that sig-
nificantly affected skill. Skill appears to be very difficult to capture by socio-demo-
graphic attributes of the skipper-proxy variables for the skipper’s human capital and
additional research could be informative in this area.
On issues of efficiency, vis-à-vis fishing skill, the empirical results from this
study indicate considerable potential for increased catches and capacity utilization
through improvements in fishing skill, especially during the off-season. Nonethe-
less, given the limited number of variables significantly affecting skill, it remains
unclear just how these gains could actually come about.
On issues of equity, vis-à-vis fishing skill, the empirical results indicate that a
captain training program for the least efficient skippers may be called for to meet
the objectives of equity and fairness as expressed in Malaysia’s New Economic
Policy and its successor, the New Development Plan. Such a training program would
also be consistent with one of the initial aims of the license limitation program,
which was to promote equity among all ethnic groups in Malaysian society. Jahara
(1988) observed that the objective of allocating fishing grounds represented a strong
emphasis on equity, and that the issue was as much politics as equitable allocation
of fishery resources between highly efficient trawlers and less efficient small-scale
fishers. It is only one more simple step forward to raise the level of efficiency of all
skippers, regardless of ethnicity, to a minimum standard, thereby contributing to eq-
uity and, hence, the objectives of the license limitation program and the New Devel-
opment Plan.16
Increasing the efficiency of all skippers, regardless of background, will increase
output. Nonetheless, the threat to sustainable resource use in an open-access re-
source must be blunted by other means to prevent overfishing to achieve
sustainability in social relations within the broad society.
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